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Confederate License Plates at the
Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates,
Special Registration Organization Plates,
Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity,
and the First Amendment
JACK ACHIEZER GUGGENHEIM*
JED M. SILVERSMITH**
I. INTRODUCTION
In states across the country, license plates have become a new con-
stitutional battleground. For a small extra cost, many states sell spe-
cialty license tags displaying the emblems of colleges, universities,
clubs, professional sports teams, and fraternal organizations ("specialty
plates").' States also will customize the arrangement of letters and num-
bers to create a plate for a small fee ("vanity plates"). While the vast
majority of specialty and vanity plates have raised no concerns, a few
have caused significant disputes and raised First Amendment challenges
to the controlling regulations.
The most substantial disagreements have been over the issuance of
plates displaying the Confederate flag to members of organizations that
use that flag as their logo. The latest controversy has erupted in Vir-
ginia, where challengers recently filed suit after the assembly refused to
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issue a specialty plate with a Confederate flag logo.2
There has also been recent debate, and potential litigation is pend-
ing, in Florida, Virginia, and Tennessee over requests for anti-abortion
logo plates. Additionally, some states have faced challenges upon deny-
ing individual requests for obscene or vulgar plates.
Several decided cases concerning a state's right to regulate custom
license plates turn on whether a viewpoint is being expressed through
the custom plate. While the disparate rulings may be so accorded, the
language of these cases contradicts itself. Specifically, these cases disa-
gree on the constitutionality of license plate regulation and on whether
license plates are forms of speech. They are also inconclusive as to
whether license plates should be considered public fora.
This article first reviews the current public debate, particularly as
reflected by legislative efforts regarding license plates. Next, the article
reviews the existing case law surrounding First Amendment challenges
to the regulations. It then will construct guiding principles for state reg-
ulation of license plates by resolving the apparent conflicts in the case
law. Finally, it examines the related jurisprudence of bumper stickers.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. Specialty Plates
The first wave of specialty license plate debate centered on a group
called the Sons of Confederate Veterans and its efforts to obtain plates
with the organization's emblem, which incorporates the Confederate
flag.
In May 1999, the Tennessee State Senate voted twenty-eight to two
to create a "Sons of the Confederacy" plate.3 The bill has been criti-
cized as offensive to African Americans and "Americans of all colors,
heritage and creeds who understand the need for healing rather than
division."4 This criticism stems from a belief that the Confederate flag
serves as a symbol of "the effort by many Southerners to rip apart the
Union in an attempt to preserve a way of life built on the evil subjuga-
tion of a race of people in slavery."5 Supporters of the bill claim that the
Confederate flag represents the principle that the states that voluntarily
entered the Union had a right to voluntarily leave the Union, as well as
2. See generally Bowman, supra note 1, at B5.
3. See Theotis Robinson Jr., Rebel Flag on License Plates Is Disservice, KNOXViLLE NEW-
SENTINEL, May 24, 1999, at A10; see also 1999 TN S.B. 350 (SN), amending TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 55-4-202(c)(7), 210(c) (1998).
4. Robinson, supra note 3, at A10.
5. Id.
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those who fought for that principle.6
One Tennessee state senator defended the vote as a protection of
liberty, noting that other groups have been able to get speciality plates in
the past.7 He stated that in protection of liberty he would even approve a
Ku Klux Klan plate.8 An editorial critical of the bill's passage stated it
is "not about the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech" but
rather comparable to a state's ability to prohibit vulgarities on custom
plates.9
In 1999, the Virginia legislature also dealt with an application by
the Sons of Confederate Veterans for a special license plate.' 0 Virginia
approved the application, but without the Confederate flag or the battle
flag of the Army of Northern Virginia that is part of the organization's
logo." In response, the Virginia division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans sued the state on First Amendment grounds. 1 2 The suit, which
was filed in a United States District Court, alleges that "[h]aving opened
its 'special license plate' program as a public free speech forum in which
motorists express their views or opinions, the defendants have discrimi-
nated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their speech, and have other-
wise selected and censored protected speech with respect to content and/
or viewpoint."'13
As is discussed below, the Sons of Confederate Veterans disputes
in Tennessee and Virginia follow those previously litigated and decided
in other states. West Virginia also may join the debate; a bill to create a
Sons of Confederate Veterans license plate with the Rebel flag logo
awaits the Governor's signature. 14 Louisiana also has considered issu-
ing a similar license plate.' 5
On a similar note, an Alabama State legislator proposed a bill that
would require the state to offer two versions of its license tag, one with
the "Heart of Dixie" motto that is currently in use, and one without it.
16
The representative who introduced the Alabama bill argued that "Dixie"
6. See Bowman, supra note 1, at B5.
7. See Robinson, supra note 3, at A10.
8. See id.
9. Id. As this essay will discuss, despite the possibility of offense, viewpoint plates, as
opposed to simple obscenities, are indeed a First Amendment free speech issue.
10. See Let License Plates Be License Plates, ROANOKE TuisEs & WORLD NEWS, May 7,
1999, at A14.
11. See id.
12. See id.; Group Sues State Over License-Plate Decision Legislature Violated Rights by
Removing Confederate Flag Logo, Lawsuit Alleges, VRGINIAr-PnOT & LEDGER STAR, July 26,
1999, at B2.
13. Bowman, supra note 1, at B5.
14. See id.
15. See 1999 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1033 (West).
16. See Across the USA, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 1999, at A12.
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represents slavery and oppression. 17
Another area of contention over license plate involves the issue of
anti-abortion license plates. In 1998, Florida's then-governor, Lawton
Chiles, vetoed a "Choose Life" license plate, stating that he was con-
cerned that the plate would display a political and divisive message. 18
Governor Chiles wrote, "The creation of an official license plate with a
clearly political message establishes a precedent that was not intended
by the development of specialty plates bearing the name and sanction of
the state of Florida.' 9 He concluded that a license plate was not the
appropriate forum for debates of political issues. °
Proponents of the plate stated that funds generated from sale of the
plate would have been used for private, non-profit agencies that would
counsel pregnant women to place their children up for adoption.2"
While some lawmakers worry that the plates might spark road rage or
encourage violence against abortion providers, supporters of the plate
plan to introduce the effort again during the administration of Florida's
present Governor, Jeb Bush.22
Virginia also has entered the anti-abortion specialty plate debate.
In February 1999, the Virginia House Transportation Committee
endorsed legislation by a vote of ten to nine to create a specialty license
plate with the slogan "Choose Life. 23 The plate would feature a
crayon-drawn image of two smiling children.24 The General Assembly
refused to approve the plate, proposing instead a plate that read "Friends
of Adoption."25 One delegate stated, "I don't think our license plates
should be used for political advocacy.... This is what you use bumper
stickers for."26 The supporters of the original "Choose Life" plate with-
drew the legislation, promising to reintroduce the legislation again the
next year.27  The American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia has
17. See id.
18. See Rado, supra note 1, at B 1.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Justin Blum, Virginia License Plate Plan Runs into Abortion Fight, WASH. POST,
Dec. 19, 1998, at BI.
23. See The General Assembly 1999 Session: Jan. 13 - Feb. 27, VIRGINIA-PILOT & LEDGER-
STAR, Feb. 7, 1999, at B4.
24. See Blum, supra note 22, at B 1.
25. See Car Tags One State, Many Plates, VIRGINIA-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 15, 1999,
at B10.
26. Blum, supra note 22, at B.
27. See Car Tags One State, Many Plates, supra note 25, at B10; Ronald J. Hansen,
Democrat Calls Query a Plus, WASH. TnMEs, Aug. 18, 1999, at C4; Legislature May Decide
Specialty License Plates Aren't Worth Controversy Program Has Become Time-Consuming,
VIRGINIA-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Aug. 9, 1999, at B4.
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demanded that a "Plan Parenthood" plate be approved if the "Choose
Life" tag is issued.28
B. Vanity Plates
Vanity plates, like specialty plates, have generated dispute and
offense. For example, one man in Chicago, who lost a friend in a drunk-
driving incident, objected to an attorney's license plate which read, "I
WIN DUI.' 2 9 In response to applications for offensive and vulgar vanity
plates, Florida has created a Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles'
Bureau of Titles and Registrations, which insures that motorists are not
granted license plates that could be construed as tasteless or offensive in
either English or a foreign language. 0
Likewise, the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles "OBMV" prohibits
personalized license plates that are vulgar, in poor taste, or convey hate
- even hate of a rival football team.3" The OBMV instituted the anti-
hate plate prohibition in response to plates issued during a labor strike
against General Motors. The OBMV approved "H8TWRK" (hate to
work) as a vanity plate, but not "H8MICH" (hate Michigan, Ohio State
University's traditional football rival). 3 2 A six-member committee of
the OBMV reviews the approximately 275 personalized plates requests
it receives each day, and a Registrar has final veto power. 33 The com-
mittee reads the proposed plates forwards and backwards, relies on a
number of dictionaries, and reviews current slang. 34 Ohio has forty-
eight three-letter combinations that are generally prohibited unless part
of someone's name, including "BUT," "GAY," "NUN," "PEE," and
"SEX." Ironically, a prisoner working on Ohio's jail license plate pro-
duction line makes the final review of requested plates, checking a
twenty-three page list of prohibited words and cryptic phrases.35
In Texas, the customer service clerk of the Department of Trans-
portation checks requests for special license plates and rejects those that
he or she deems inappropriate or offensive.36 Department rules require
28. See Todd Jackson, Group Hoists Rebel Flag in New Fight Civil Rights Disputes Drive
Debate About License Plates, RoANoKE TIMsS & WoRLD NEWS, Jan. 21, 1999, at Al.
29. See Stan Rosenberg, Offensive Vanity Plate, Cm. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 21, 1999, at 10.
30. See Considering an Offensive License Tag?, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al.
31. See No H8 on License Plates in Ohio, PLAIN DEALER, May 27, 1999, at B5.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Jill Riepenhoff, A Lock on the Market: Prisoners Are Still Manufacturing Ohio's
License Plates, and Saying Jobs with Old Equipment Are Best Ones Behind Bars, PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 28, 1997, at B8.
36. See No Profanity for Vanity Plates; Workers Become Linguistic Sleuths in Weeding Out
Requests for Licentious License Plates, AusTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 11, 1996, at B3.
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rejection if a request is obscene or objectionable.37 Aside from noting
that ethnic slurs are "objectionable," the rules are open to interpretation
although the bureau defers to the New Dictionary of American Slang by
Robert L. Chapman as the definitive authority.38
Oregon also screens applications for vanity plates.39 Its refusal to
issue certain vanity plates has generated litigation. A wine enthusiast
sued to be able to use "VINO" (the spanish word for wine) on his license
plate.4° Another Oregonian sued when the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles refused to allow him to use his "69" plates, which he originally had
on a 1969 car, on a 1976 car.4' The DMV argued that "69," when used
out of the context of a 1969 car, is a "euphemism for a sex act."42
Another Oregonian sued and won the right to use a plate that said
"PRAY. 43
C. Opposing Positions in the Debate
To avoid allegations of discrimination against license plate appli-
cants based on viewpoint, some suggest that states' motor vehicles
departments should determine which groups should get speciality plates
by passing a mandate that rejects all applications from groups that have
even remotely political purposes.44 The American Civil Liberties Union
of Oregon, however, argues that a state has no right to restrict anything
on a license plate unless it poses a traffic threat or is already on another
plate.45
In response to the protection the First Amendment may lend to
offensive viewpoint license plates, there has been a call by some to uni-
formly end all types of custom plates.46 By making a blanket decision
not aimed at, or in reaction to, any specific viewpoint, states avoid
unconstitutional discrimination.47 States, however, are very reluctant to
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See ACLU Threatens Action on Oregon's Vanity License Plate Controls, COLUMBIAN,
Sept. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13549266.
40. See id.
41. See Gordon Oliver, DMV Says Vanity Plates Aren't License to Titillate, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 1996, at B1.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See License Plates Steer Clear of Silliness, VIRGINIA-PLoT & LEDGER-STAR, Aug. 11,
1999, at B0.
45. See ACLU Threatens Action on Oregon's Vanity License Plate Controls, supra note 39.
Approximately one out of every 100 custom plate requests is rejected in Oregon because the
wording is deemed offensive. See id.
46. See License to Offend, BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES, May 16, 1997, at 8.
47. See Let License Plates Be License Plates, supra note 10, at A 14; License to Offend, supra
note 46, at 8.
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give up the easy revenue vanity and specialty plates generate.48
This article attempts to clarify the constitutional baselines so that
the cost-benefit evaluation of revenues to unpopular plates, which sur-
vive regulation attempts, may be calculated. It also provides guidance to
states on regulating custom plates. The analysis begins with a discus-
sion of the cases already decided in this arena.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL LICENSE-PLATE RESTRICTION CASES
The cases that have found license plate regulations unconstitutional
or their application unconstitutional seem to turn on whether the regula-
tion was attempting to regulate a viewpoint. While the courts' reasoning
is not always clear, and the cases do not define "viewpoint," the courts
that have found such regulations unconstitutional seem to do so based on
the view that a license plate is speech and that such speech presents a
viewpoint when it is expressive of an idea that is more than a mere
vulgarity or profanity. Notably, these cases do not reach the question of
whether vanity plates and specialty plates are a public forum.
A. Pruitt v. Wilder
In Pruitt v. Wilder,49 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia held that a state's ban on references to deities on
vanity plates was a viewpoint-based regulation of speech which violated
the plate-applicant's free speech rights.50 The dispute in Pruitt arose out
of the Virginia Division of Motor Vehicle's ("DMV") personalized
automobile license plate policy. This policy is called "CommuniPlate."
The statute announcing the policy provides in relevant part that "[t]he
Commissioner [of the DMV] may, in his discretion, reserve license
plates with certain registration numbers or letters or combinations
thereof for issuance to persons requesting license plates so numbered
and lettered."51 When a CommuniPlate request was made, the DMV
branch office personnel reviewed it to see if it ran afoul of a list of
prohibited words and phrases.52 If the request was not on the list but
still seemed questionable it was referred to a "word committee" for a
determination.53 The DMV had not promulgated formal guidelines for
48. See Legislature May Decide Specialty License Plates Aren't Worth Controversy Program
Has Become Time-Consuming, supra note 27, at B4. The response has been so positive that
collector groups have emerged such as the Automobile License Plate Collectors Association. See,
e.g., http://www.alpca.org.
49. 840 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Va. 1994).
50. See id. at 415.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-726 (Michie 1998).
52. See Pruitt, 840 F. Supp. at 416.
53. See id.
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the CommuniPlate program, but it relied upon the following policy
statement to determine which plates to issue and which to prohibit:
"Licenses are not to be issued with any reference to drug culture, lewd
and obscene words, deities, or combinations which might otherwise be
considered offensive. 5" The DMV added the prohibition against deity
plates to avoid efforts to demean religion or to identify Virginia with a
particular religion."
In Pruitt, the plaintiff applied for a plate saying "GODZGUD. ' '5 6
After the Virginia DMV twice denied the application because it referred
to a deity, Pruitt sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on
the grounds that Virginia had violated his right to free speech and dis-
criminated against him on the basis of his viewpoint. 7 In response to
the complaint, Virginia voluntarily altered its CommuniPlate policy to
remove the ban on references to deities. 8 This did not render the case
moot as, absent a contrary ruling, the state retained discretion to volunta-
rily revert to the policy.5 9
The court ruled for Pruitt, finding that the portion of the DMV pol-
icy which banned references to deities represented viewpoint-based reg-
ulation of speech and, as such, violated the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.6 ° Significantly, the court did not address whether
the license plate was a public forum. Instead, it assumed the plate was a
non-public forum for purposes of Pruitt's motion.61
The court found that although a non-public forum can be regulated
based on subject matter, the regulation must be viewpoint neutral. 62 The
court determined that the DMV's policy was not viewpoint neutral
because "allowing one sub-set [sic] of religious speech - that not
directly referring to a deity - to be placed on CommuniPlates, while
denying another subset of religious speech - that referring to deities -
... discriminates on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint. '63
54. Id. at 415-16.
55. See id. at 416.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 417.
61. See id. at 417 n.2.
62. See id. at 417 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993)).
63. Id. at 418. Interestingly, the court implied that if indeed license plates were not a public
forum, a complete ban of certain subjects, such as religion, might be appropriate. The ban of
certain religious speech, however, was inappropriate. In fact, the court indicated that the
defendant might need to institute a complete ban on religious plates if an Establishment Clause
problem existed. See id.
[Vol. 54:563
LICENSE PLATES & THE FIRST AMENDMENT
B. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening
In Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening,64 an organiza-
tion whose members were descendants of Confederate Civil War veter-
ans brought an action against state officials challenging a Maryland
Motor Vehicle Administration's decision to deny the group's request for
specialty license plates displaying the Confederate flag.65 The district
court determined that the agency's denial constituted impermissible
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.66
In Maryland, the Motor Vehicle Administration "MVA", registers
motor vehicles and issues license plates, including specialty registration
plates for non-profit organizations.67 The organization plates may or
may not display an organization's logo.68 Because the MVA regulations
do not specify any criteria for accepting or rejecting an organization's
logo, the MVA relies on the criteria established by Maryland for issu-
ance of vanity plates.69 For vanity plates, MVA administrators may
refuse an application if the plates's contents could be considered, among
other things, a term of bigotry or hostility.7"
The Sons of Confederate Veterans ("SCV") applied for plates with
the organization's name and a logo containing the Confederate flag.7"
The MVA initially issued seventy-eight such plates without comment.72
Subsequently, the MVA received numerous complaints about the plates
and decided to withdraw its approval.73 In response, SCV brought a
complaint alleging that Maryland had violated its First Amendment right
to free speech. 74 Among other things, SCV sought a declaratory judg-
ment, a mandatory injunction that the MVA continue issuing SCV spe-
cialty plates, and a prohibitory injunction preventing the MVA from
recalling the logo plates already issued.75 Maryland conceded that the
logo did constitute speech.76 It argued, however, that it had not violated
the group's First Amendment right because license plates do not consti-
tute a public forum. It added that the MVA's actions were reasonable
64. 954 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Md. 1997).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 13-619 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
68. See Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1101.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1101-02. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06 (1989).
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and viewpoint neutral.77
The court found that it did not need to decide what type of forum
license plates constituted because the MVA's actions were viewpoint
discrimination and impermissible in any forum.7 8 The court rejected
Maryland's view that the MVA's guidelines prohibit hostile or racially
derogatory expressions from any and all points of view.79 The court
found, instead, that refusing an entire class of viewpoints is still view-
point discrimination.8 °
As an addendum to the analysis in Glendening, it is worth noting a
similar case that was decided on a different issue. In North Carolina
Division of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner,8" the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that SCV was a "civic club" for purposes of a
statute governing eligibility for special license plates.82 As a result, it
reversed a decision by the North Carolina DMV that had denied SCV a
specialty plate reserved for civic clubs. In Faulkner, the decision turned
solely on whether SCV had adequately demonstrated that it was a civic
club as defined by the state statute. The court, however, also noted that
"[a]llowing some organizations which fall within section 20-79.4(b)(5)'s
criteria to obtain personalized plates while disallowing others equally
within the criteria could implicate the First Amendment's restrictions
against content-based restraints on free speech."83
C. Dimmick v. Quigley
In Dimmick v. Quigley,84 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff
against the California Department of Motor Vehicles, which had refused
to issue the plaintiff a vanity license plate reading "HIV POS."85 The
court ruled that the DMV's refusal to issue the requested license plates
violated the plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech.86 The
court distinguished between public discourse, which could not be pro-
77. See Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1101.
78. See id. at 1103.
79. See id.
80. See id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Department of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995); Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414
(E.D. Va. 1994)).
81. 509 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 209 n. 1.
84. See N.D. Cal. No. 96-3987, discussed in Dimmick v. Lungren, No. C98-4137SI, 1999
WL 111793 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1999), and in Bob Egelko, AIDS Sufferer Entitled to 'HIV POS'
License Plate, Calif. Judge Rules, DAmY REc. BALTIMORE, July 23, 1998, at 2C.
85. See Lungren, 1999 WL 111793, at *1.
86. Id.
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hibited from appearing on license plates, and racial, ethnic, and religious
slurs, which are inherently offensive.87 The court noted that the DMV
could enforce decency standards in other cases, but its application to this
plaintiff constituted viewpoint discrimination.88
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LICENSE PLATE RESTRICTION CASES
In contrast to the above cases, which found license plate regulations
unconstitutional as applied, the cases that have upheld such regulations
explicitly find that license plates are not public forums, license plates are
not speech, and license plates are not viewpoint expressive.
A. Katz v. Department of Motor Vehicles
In Katz v. Department of Motor Vehicles,89 the California Court of
Appeals held that a statute permitting the DMV to refuse to issue a van-
ity license plate that read "EZ LAY" did not abridge freedom of expres-
sion rights.90 The plaintiff challenged California Vehicle Code section
5105 as unconstitutional on its face and as applied.91 Section 5105
states in pertinent part, "There shall be no duplication of registration
numbers, and the department may refuse to issue any combination of
letters or numbers, or both, that may carry connotations offensive to
good taste and decency or which would be misleading or a duplication
of license plates." 92 Furthermore, the code provides, "[The DMV may]
cancel and order the return of any [vanity] license plate ... containing
any combination of letters, or numbers, or both, which the department
determines carries connotations offensive to good taste and decency or
which would be misleading." 93
The Katz court found that the statute did not curtail plaintiffs First
Amendment rights because, "Katz' right to express the language of his
choice remain[ed] totally unimpaired by the statute as Katz is free to put
on his car or in the metal frame surrounding the license plate any combi-
nation of words and letters that he chooses. 94
The court also held that the license plate was expressive conduct
but not speech per se.95 The court looked to the standard enunciated by
87. See Egelko, supra note 84, at C2.
88. See id.
89. 108 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Ct. App. 1973).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 425.
92. Id. at 425-26 (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 5105(a) (West 1970)).
93. Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 9 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
CAL. VEH. CODE § 5105(b) (West 1970)).
94. Katz, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
95. See id. at 427.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien:9 6
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms... [A] government regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restrictions on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.97
The Katz court found that the case before it was similar to O'Brien
because "Vehicle Code section 5105 further[ed] a substantial govern-
mental interest in vehicle identification consistent with community stan-
dards of good taste and decency, and impos[ed] at best a minimal and
incidental restriction on Katz's alleged First Amendment freedom of
expression."" The court noted that the impact on Katz's First Amend-
ment rights, if any, was negligible and incidental, and that the statute
was not directed towards suppression of idea or expression.99 Rather,
the statute excluded from the very limited parameters of a government
mechanism a set of configurations of letters and numbers which were
determined to be offensive to good taste and decency. °°
The Katz court also found that license plates do not constitute an
open forum.101 The court based this determination on the fact that the
state only permitted minor variations from the license plate form and
shape, and the state had not strayed from the license plate's purpose as
an identifying mechanism. 10 2 Furthermore, the court found that the state
was neutrally protecting the legitimacy of its identification symbol, not
promoting or compelling any particular point of view.10 3
96. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
97. Id. at 376-77.
98. Katz v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (Ct. App. 1973).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 428.
102. See id.
103. See id. Katz also argued that the DMV acted arbitrarily in denying his request since it
issued the following other plates: BALL, BALLS, BFD, BIPPY, BJ, BOOBS, BS, DIK, EAT
OUT, EZ HOOK, FCK, FERN, FUCHS, HOOKER, HOT BOD, HOT BOX HORNEE, HORNY,
KILLER, PUSSY, 4 PLAY, SCREW 2, SLEEZ, SLEEZY, STUD, and VIRGIN. See id. at 429
n.4. The court found that this only meant the DMV needed a better control system, not that the
statute was arbitrarily applied. See id. at 429.
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B. Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles
In Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles," the California Court
of Appeals addressed an extremely interesting set of facts. 105 Kahn, a
certified court reporter employed by the Culver City Municipal Court,
obtained a vanity plate in 1972.1" The plate read "TP U BG," which in
stenographic court reporting symbols can be understood as "if you
can." 107 "If you can" was a motivating phrase Kahn adopted based on
the story of "The Little Engine That Could."'10 8 Seventeen years later,
another court reporter complained to the California Department of
Motor Vehicles that in stenography "TP U BG" could read as the exple-
tive "fuck." 1" In fact, it would naturally be read as the expletive and
read as "if you can" only in the proper context. While the plaintiff had
not intended to display the expletive form, the DMV nonetheless asked
that she surrender her license plates. °
In reviewing the case, the court heard a sociology professor who
testified that the expletive is the "preeminent" curse word and is insult-
ing if used in reference to someone and that the word can deeply offend
and even cause a violent reaction."' The court reasoned that a license
plate with the expletive could create a problem "in that it would be seen
by those who would be offended" and that "additionally, the state is
actually producing the word and that in itself could be seen as
offensive.""t 2
Kahn, like Katz before her, challenged California Vehicle Code
section 5105 as unconstitutional on its face and as applied." 3 The court
disagreed with the plaintiff, finding first that there was no censor of a
forum for the free expression of ideas. The court determined that a
license plate was not a First Amendment forum as it was not comparable
to an open space, meeting hall, park, street comer, or other public thor-
oughfare." 4 The court stated:
That the state permits license holders, for an additional fee, to vary
minimally their vehicle identification from the prescribed form by
selecting letter and/or number combinations which may reflect an
individual's personal or professional identity, or possibly express a
104. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (1993).
105. See id.
106. Id. at 7.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 8.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 9.
114. See id. at 10 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-304 (1974)).
20001
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
thought or idea, is purely incidental to the primary function of vehicle
identification. 115
As a result, the court found that the state was not regulating an "open
forum."1 16
As in Katz, the Kahn court found that the license plate was expres-
sive conduct, not speech per se. 117 Therefore, the court once again
applied the United States Supreme Court O'Brien standard, which is dis-
cussed above." 18
The Kahn court next found that the state has a substantial interest in
protecting its license plates from degradation. 19 "That is, the DMV rea-
sonably is concerned with avoiding the abusive use of its vehicle identi-
fication system and preserving the legitimacy, credibility and reliability
of its official emblem."12 The court also found that Vehicle Code sec-
tion 5105 did not suppress free expression in that it did not prohibit
conduct intended to communicate an idea, viewpoint or opinion.12 1
Rather, it limited "to a slight degree the combinations of letters and
numbers one may choose as a vehicle identification symbol."'' 22
Based on the above analysis, the Kahn court concluded that Vehicle
Code section 5105 was not facially unconstitutional.1 23 The court also
concluded that section 5105 was not unconstitutional as applied to plain-
tiff because "[s]he remains free to express the same sentiment on her
vehicle by using a bumper sticker, license plate holder or similar
medium; she simply cannot continue to do so via the license plate
itself.' 24
V. LICENSE-PLATE GUIDELINES
The cases discussed above all depend on the same principle: where
the license plate expressed a viewpoint, restrictive regulation was uncon-
stitutional; where the license plate did not express a viewpoint, but only
an obscenity or vulgarity, the restrictive regulation was constitutional.
This distinction does play a role in the analysis, but the assessment must
be more detailed. The decisions upholding the license plate regulations
stated that the plates do not constitute speech. These holdings, however,
115. Id.
116. Seeid.
117. See id.
118. Seeid.
119. See id. at 11 (quoting Katz v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428 (Ct. App.
1973)).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 11-12 (citing Katz, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 426).
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do not comport with the language in the decisions that held such regula-
tions to be unconstitutional. Furthermore, the decisions upholding the
regulations stated that a license plate is not a public forum. This con-
trasts with the cases that found the regulations unconstitutional and
expressed a likelihood that the plates were a public forum.
A logical explanation of these differences distinguishes specialty
plates from vanity plates. This distinction is buttressed by Wooley v.
Maynard.25 In Wooley, the Supreme Court held that New Hampshire
could not constitutionally require individuals to disseminate an ideologi-
cal point of view by requiring residents to have a license plate with the
motto, "Live Free or Die." '26 The Court specifically distinguished pas-
senger license plates, which "consist of a specific configuration of letters
and numbers," from license plates with mottos.127 The next section of
the article explains justifications for such a distinction and when the
distinction is relevant.
A. Type of Forum Created
Specialty plates should be considered a limited public forum,
whereas vanity plates should be considered a nonpublic forum.
The First Amendment does not protect all speech in all places and
under all circumstances.1 28 The government "has [the] power to pre-
serve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."' 29 To determine whether the government's interest in
restricting the use of its property outweighs the interest of those who
desire to use the property, the Supreme Court has prescribed a "forum"
analysis. 130 The extent to which government can lawfully regulate
speech under this analysis depends upon the nature of the forum at
issue. 131
The United States Supreme Court has recognized "three types of
fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by govern-
ment designation, and the nonpublic forum." 13 2 Traditional public fora
are places, such as public streets and parks, which "by long tradition or
by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."1 33 A
125. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
126. See id. at 717.
127. Id. at 716.
128. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985);
Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
129. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 802 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
133. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
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limited or designated public forum is "created by government designa-
tion of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the
discussion of certain subjects."' 134 A nonpublic forum is "[p]ublic prop-
erty which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public commu-
nication." 135 It consists of property whose function usually is
incompatible with expressive activity.1 36
Government regulation of speech in both the traditional and lim-
ited, or designated, public fora is subject to strict scrutiny. 37 Thus, a
content-based regulation in either of these fora is presumed unconstitu-
tional and will be permitted only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.13 8 The government also may enforce
narrowly tailored and content-neutral time, place, and manner restric-
tions if the restrictions serve a significant government interest and leave
open ample alternate channels of communication. 139
In the nonpublic forum, however, government regulation of speech
is subject only to a reasonableness test with a requirement of viewpoint
neutrality. 40 Thus, "[c]ontrol over ... a nonpublic forum can be based
on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn
are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are view-
point neutral. '1 4 The government may restrict access based on content
if "the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view."1
42
The purpose of specialty plates and their value to organizations
using them is as a "place or channel of communication for use ... for
...speech ...by certain speakers ... for the discussion of certain
subjects."'' 43 The specialty plate allows an organization to promote its
recognition through its members' display of its logo. As the Supreme
Court held in Wooley, adding a motto to a license plate turns it into a
"mobile billboard."' 44 This specialty plate, however, is not a traditional
134. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 & n.7).
135. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
136. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
137. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (citing Perry 460 U.S. at 45).
138. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
139. See id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
140. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
141. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49).
142. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 131 n.7).
143. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 46 n.7).
144. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
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public forum such as a public street or park, which "by long tradition or
by government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate." '145
Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, therefore, courts should char-
acterize a specialty license plate as a limited public forum subject to
strict scrutiny. 14 6 A content-based regulation of specialty plates should
be presumed unconstitutional and only permitted if narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. 1
47
Because the specialty license plate is a limited public forum, the
statements of some legal scholars become clear that "when state officials
began granting special license plates to groups with a political identifica-
tion, such as the National Rifle Association and the AFL-CIO, they...
took an irreversible step toward making the plates a mode of protected
speech."' 48 These off-the-cuff remarks can be understood to apply to
specialty plates, which, unlike vanity plates, are associated with
organizations.
Vanity plates, in contrast, constitute a nonpublic forum as they are
"[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication."' 49 Vanity plates are distinct from specialty
plates because the latter significantly change the appearance of the plate,
giving the plate a substantial secondary purpose. The purpose of the
vanity plate is still to identify to the state the owner of a vehicle. There
is no added element such as a logo. The vanity plate merely allows the
owner to select which letters and numbers, from the general pool of
letters and numbers used for all license plates, are to be used for the
owner. As the court noted in Katz, the vanity plate permits only minor
variations from the standard license plate and has not strayed from the
license plate's purpose as an identifying mechanism.' 50 The court in
Kahn likewise noted that the vanity plate only minimally varies the
"vehicle identification from the prescribed form by selecting letter and/
or number combinations" and any reflection of an individual's personal
or professional identity "is purely incidental to the primary function of
vehicle identification."' 151
145. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
146. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
147. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
148. Legislature May Decide Specialty Plates Aren't Worth Controversy Program Has
Become Time Consuming, supra note 27, at B4. Professor Vincent Blasi of Columbia Law School
said "The state [of Virginia] is in trouble. The legal test is usually whether a state has created a
public forum for political speech.... The state has probably gone too far in allowing this sort of
thing to say it can restrict it for one group now." Id.
149. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
150. See Katz v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428 (Ct. App. 1973).
151. Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1993).
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B. Speech or Expressive Conduct
The discrepancies between the cases as to whether license plates
constitute speech or merely expressive conduct are hard to clarify but
they can be reconciled by distinguishing between specialty plates and
vanity plates. Specialty plates constitute speech because the plate con-
tains the extra dimension of an organization name and a symbolic logo.
In short, they overtly articulate speech. Vanity plates, on the other hand,
are only a simple and limited manipulation of letters and numbers. As
such, they convey speech only implicitly. Indeed, customized vanity
plates may be so difficult to understand as to be indistinguishable from
randomly issued plates. Conversely, it is possible that randomly issued
plates may by chance comprise a word or phrase. Vanity plates are
therefore not automatically speech, but should be deemed speech only
when they are clear articulations. This distinction could arguably
explain the difference between Pruitt and Dimmick which, although
dealing with vanity plates and not specialty plates, were more apparent
articulations of speech, and Katz and Kahn, which dealt with more cov-
ert articulations of speech.
While specialty plates should automatically be afforded the protec-
tions given to speech, vanity plates should be protected only when they
are clearly articulations of speech. This is a very serious distinction
because speech is more likely than expressive conduct to be found view-
point indicative. As such, specialty plates will enjoy the protections of
viewpoint indicative speech.
C. Viewpoint Discrimination
Regardless of the type of forum, any governmental regulation of
speech must be viewpoint-neutral. That is, the government may not tar-
get the "particular views taken by speakers on a subject,"' 52 in an effort
"to discourage one viewpoint and advance another."' 53 Nor may the
government restrict speech based on "the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker." '154 When the government
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress his or her point of view,
"the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. 1 55 The
rationale for prohibiting the government from engaging in viewpoint
discrimination is that such actions raise "the specter that the government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
152. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, (1995).
153. Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194,
1198 (9th Cir. 1987), cited with approval in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990).
154. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
155. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
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place." '15 6 As Justice Kennedy wrote on behalf of the Supreme Court
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission: 157
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each per-
son should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving
of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system
and cultural life rest upon this ideal. . . . Government action that
stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance
of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this
essential right.'58
The Supreme Court has declared that "[c]ontent-based regulations
are presumptively invalid."' 59 The general rule is that content-based
restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral
regulations need meet only intermediate scrutiny. 16° Because the gov-
ernment must be content-neutral in its regulation of speech, it must be
both viewpoint neutral and subject matter neutral. 161 As one legal
scholar succinctly characterized, "Viewpoint neutral means that the gov-
ernment cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the
message,"'162 while subject matter neutral means that "the government
cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the speech."'' 63
Although the Supreme Court occasionally has upheld subject mat-
ter speech restrictions, it never has upheld viewpoint-based restric-
tions."6 The Supreme Court, however, has failed to actually define
what constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 165 In assessing license plates,
156. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991)).
157. 515 U.S. 622 (1994).
158. Id. at 641.
159. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115).
160. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Comms. Comm'n, 512 U.S. at 662, 661-62 (1994).
161. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
162. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Takes Narrow View of Viewpoint Discrimination, TRIAL, Mar.
1999, 90, 90. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional a District
of Columbia ordinance prohibiting display of signs critical of foreign government within 500 feet
of government's embassy because law, by its very terms, limited certain speech based on
viewpoint); Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1227-28 (1993).
163. Chemerinsky, supra note 162, at 90. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)
(holding Illinois statute prohibiting all picketing in residential neighborhoods unless it was labor
picketing connected to a place of employment unconstitutional because when the government
attempts to regulate speech in public places, it must be subject matter neutral); Sabrin, supra note
162, at 1227-28.
164. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (allowing ordinance
permitting commercial advertisement on buses but prohibiting political advertisements);
Chemerinsky, supra note 162, at 90 & 91 n.10 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
(upholding restrictions on campaign activity proximate to polling stations)).
165. See Chemerinsky, supra note 162.
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this article therefore recommends that a distinction be drawn between
specialty plates and vanity plates. Specialty plates should be presumed
viewpoint expressive because their purpose is to identify vehicle owners
with a specific organization and show that owners endorse such organi-
zations' purpose and objectives. For example, in Wooley the Supreme
Court found that New Hampshire, by insisting that plates bear the state
motto, was "seeking to communicate to others an official view as to
proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism." '66
In contrast, a vanity plate is merely an ordering of letters and num-
bers that might otherwise be used for a plate in the ordinary course of
issuance. Therefore, the applicant of a vanity plate must meet a burden
of affirmatively showing that the plate is viewpoint expressive. Only if
it clearly articulates a position should it be considered a viewpoint.
This rubric resolves the apparent conflict between the decided
cases. In Pruitt, Glendening, and Dimmick, the courts found that the
license plates communicated a viewpoint. Glendening addressed spe-
cialty plates, which, under the proposal of this article, enjoy a presump-
tion of being a viewpoint. Pruitt and Dimmick meet the vanity plate
viewpoint burden because the plates at issue express societal ideas:
divine benevolence and the prevalence of AIDS. The courts found these
plates expressed viewpoints and thus were entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. In contrast, the vanity plates in Katz and Kahn merely transmit-
ted vulgarity and obscenity, specifically, sexual promiscuity and an
expletive term. These plates failed to meet the vanity plate burden. For
this reason, the courts found no expression of a viewpoint, and no Con-
stitutional protection.
The decisions in Katz and Kahn are also consistent with the gener-
ally relaxed constitutional protection of obscenity and vulgarity. 67
Expression which is offensive to the local community, appeals to the
prurient interest, and lacks serious value, receives almost no First
Amendment protection. 68
166. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
167. See generally Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99
(1996).
168. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See also Barnes v. Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (allowing regulation of nude
entertainment); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (permitting students to be
punished for delivering speeches with sexual innuendo at assemblies); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding regulation of adult book and video stores); Federal
Comms. Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing FCC to regulate indecent
radio and television programming); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)
(allowing removal of indecent literary works from school curriculum).
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D. The Guidelines
The above analysis leads to two guidelines, one for specialty plates
and one for vanity plates. Specialty plates should be considered a lim-
ited public forum, expressing speech which is presumptively a view-
point. Vanity plates, on the other hand, should be considered nonpublic
forums, which may possibly be speech and viewpoint expressive. This
distinction creates a burden shift. For specialty plates, the state must
show either that the plate is not speech and not viewpoint expressive or
that the plate regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest.169 For vanity plates, however, the plate-applicant must
affirmatively show, and overcome the contrary presumption, that the
plate is speech and viewpoint expressive.
If a vanity plate can affirmatively be shown to be speech, but can-
not be shown to be viewpoint expressive, it is only entitled to intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Only where it can be demonstrated affirmatively that a
vanity plate is also viewpoint expressive is it entitled to strict scrutiny.
If it is not viewpoint expressive and not even speech per se, but merely
expressive, the government can justify restrictive regulations by merely
showing a sufficiently important interest. In contrast, specialty plates
should be presumed to be expressing speech and viewpoints. They
therefore should be presumptively entitled to strict scrutiny constitu-
tional protection.
VI. BUMPER STICKERS
The Kahn court based its holding, in part, on the belief that an
individual may freely display any bumper sticker. The effect of its deci-
sion to restrict what a car owner may display on his license plate would
be de minimis. 170 Given the reasoning in Kahn, this article will review
the caselaw on bumper stickers. An analyses of the jurisprudence of
bumper stickers suggests that the Kahn court correctly found that, with
the exception of obscenities, a state generally may not prevent an indi-
vidual from displaying whatever he desires on the bumper of his car. 171
Most courts have found state restrictions on bumper stickers uncon-
stitutional. Nonetheless, several states have statutes prohibiting the dis-
play of obscene bumper stickers. 172 The legality of these statutes is
questionable. Several courts have found that laws prohibiting bumper
169. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing
Carey v. Brown, 477 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
170. See Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (Ct. App. 1993).
171. See id. at 11-12. Public organizations may, however, prohibit certain bumper stickers.
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (1994); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a) (West
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-187 (1998).
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stickers, even those that contain offensive language such as "fuck" and
"shit," are unconstitutional. 1 3
The standard for states wishing to regulate bumper stickers is quite
high. The federal district court in the District of Columbia has held that
the state must overcome an onerous burden before it can demonstrate
that a bumper sticker may be prohibited. 174 In Fire Fighters Associa-
tion, fire fighters protested against the city by displaying bumper stick-
ers that read, "D.C. Fire Department-It's Not Just A Job, It's A Joke,
Too !"' 7  The district court held that the city's concern with its residents
respect for the fire department was outweighed by the fire fighters' First
Amendment rights.1 76
Courts will, however, generally allow public organizations to
restrict what bumper stickers their employees display. For example, in
Ethredge v. Hail,177 a civilian Air Force employee challenged an Air
Force administration order that prohibited the plaintiff from display-
ing, while on military property, a bumper sticker that disparaged the
Commander-in-Chief.178  The court found that the parking lot was
a non-public forum, so the order would be upheld as long as its applica-
tion was reasonable.' 79  The court concluded that the administrative
order was reasonable because it did not prohibit "robust criticism of
the President; instead it bar[red] only those messages that embarrass
or disparage the Commander-in-Chief."' 8 ° Similarly, in Connealy v.
Walsh,' 8' a state social services agency fired a social worker because
173. Compare Baker v. Glover, 776 F. Supp. 1551 (M.D. Ala. 1991), with ALA. CODE § 13A-
12-131 (1994). See, e.g., Cunningham v. State, 400 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Ga. 1991); State v. Meyers,
462 So. 2d 227, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); City of
New Orleans v. Lyons, 342 So. 2d 196, 198-99 (La. 1977)).
174. See Fire Fighters Ass'n., D.C. v. Barry, 742 F. Supp. 1182, 1189 (D.D.C. 1990). See also
Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 475 (5th Cir. 1971).
175. Fire Fighters, 742 F. Supp. at 1185.
176. See id. at 1191.
177. 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995).
178. See id. at 1325.
179. See id. at 1328 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985)).
180. Id. The court hesitantly addressed this issue. Initially, the court found that the issue was
moot. The plaintiff had first displayed a bumper sticker deriding President Bush. Before the court
rendered the decision, but after the plaintiff filed his suit, President Bush lost the 1992 election.
See Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173 (11 th Cir. 1993). The second case arose only after the
plaintiff displayed a bumper sticker criticizing President Clinton. See Ethredge, 56 F.3d at 1326.
Similarly, in Speed v. Moffat, 477 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972), the court dealt with a
statute prohibiting city employees from displaying a bumper sticker which would convey that
employee's preference in a municipal election. The appellate court held that plaintiff, city
employee, did not have standing because his "pleading has stated his case in hypothetical form,
and no violation, reprimand or disciplinary action against him has been alleged or proven." Id. at
395.
181. 412 F. Supp. 146, 152 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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she had a political bumper sticker endorsing Presidential candidate
George McGovern.182 The employer maintained that it terminated the
plaintiff because she displayed the bumper sticker on her car in violation
of the employer's policy.1 83 The policy limited what social workers
could display on their vehicles. 84 The court found for the employer,
holding that the state policy did not violate the plaintiffs First Amend-
ment rights.1 85 The court reasoned that "although the effect of a partisan
political bumper sticker cannot be generalized, under some circum-
stances depending on the nature of the bumper sticker and the person
receiving the counseling, a partisan political bumper sticker could have
an adverse impact on the efficiency of the social worker." '186
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has proposed guidelines for evaluating license plate
regulations based upon a distinction between specialty plates and vanity
plates, as well as the limited case law addressing license plate regula-
tion. States may regulate license plates to prohibit obscenities and vul-
garities, but states generally may not restrict specialty plates. For vanity
plates, states may likewise not restrict viewpoint plates beyond prohibit-
ing obscenity and vulgarity. The state must in fact overcome serious
constitutional hurdles just to regulate vanity plates which have affirma-
tively been shown to constitute speech per se and must even meet essen-
tial constitutional concerns to regulate vanity plates that have
affirmatively been shown to be expressive. States must balance this
onus against the increased revenue generated by the sale of specialty
plates and vanity plates.187 They also must consider that these custom
plates may be used as constitutionally-protected mini-billboards that can
broadcast hate, offense, and disparagement across the highways of
America.
182. See id. at 148.
183. See id. at 150.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 158.
186. Id. at 152.
187. States which already have specialty plate and vanity plate programs can constitutionally
end these programs. The government may close a limited nonpublic forum entirely. See Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Robert L. Waring,
Comment, Talk Is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F.
L. Rav. 541, 555 (1995) (quoting Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv.
1219, 1220-21 (1984)).
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